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History does not exist without people, and whatever 
is described happens through and to people.1)
Geoffrey Elton, The Practice of History, 1967, 94.
The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (ofﬁcially the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East) was set up by an executive order of General Douglas MacArthur (1880–
1964), the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, on January 19, 1946.2)
The Charter set forth the constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the IMTFE.  Earli-
er, on September 2, 1945, MacArthur had accepted the Japanese surrender, aboard 
the USS Missouri.  The IMTFE began on May 3, 1946, and ended sixty years ago on 
November 12, 1948, when verdicts and the “majority opinion alone were read in open 
court and so became part of the transcript.”3)
There were three dissenting, separate opinions.  Eleven Justices constituted the 
IMTFE: one each from Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, India, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Soviet Union and United States.  The dissent-
ing opinions were from Justice Henri Bernard (France), Justice Radhabinod Pal (In-
dia), and Justice Bert V. A. Röling (The Netherlands).4)  Pal’s (1886–1967) lengthy dis-
sent “argued for the acquittal on all counts of the accused Japanese wartime leaders.”5)
His dissent “was as long as the twelve-hundred page majority” judgment.6)  A leading 
historian, John Dower, comments: “SCAP did not permit Pal’s dissent to be translat-
ed.”7)  Richard Minear writes: “Tanaka Masaaki . . . allege[d] that the Occupation au-
thorities blocked the publication in Japan of Justice Pal’s dissent.  An edited and trans-
lated version of Pal’s dissent by Tanaka, Masaaki was published as Zenyaku: Nihon 
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Muzai-ron ( Japan Is Not Guilty) in 1952.  The Occupation ended on April 28, 1952.”8)
Though, “he [Pal] asked Webb [ Justice William Webb, Australian president of the IM-
TFE] to have the entire text read in open court, according to the Indian practice.  The 
majority voted to have only its existence announced, which Webb did on the day of 
the sentencing, November 12, [1948].”9)  An appeal by the condemned men to Ma-
cArthur was rejected, while another to the Supreme Court of the United States was 
“dismissed for lack of jurisdiction” and the “men condemned to death were executed 
on December 23, 1948.”10)  Dower remarks:
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the conduct of the bench, however, lay in the 
fact that the eleven justices never [italics added] collectively met in chamber to se-
riously discuss and deliberate the ﬁnal judgment, no less how it should be argued 
and presented.  Instead, as Röling described it, seven justices ‘just decided among 
themselves to write the judgement [sic ]. . . .  The seven organized the drafting, 
and presented the results to the other four as a fait accompli [original].’11)
Prominent among those handed guilty verdicts and ordered to be hanged, from our 
perspective, were, among others, General To¯jo¯, Hideki (General; Prime Minister and 
Army Minister, 1941–44) and General Matsui, Iwane (General, Commander-in-chief, 
Japan Forces in Central China, 1937–38).  In all, seven men were condemned to be 
hanged.  Sixteen defendants received life imprisonment, two died during trial, and 
“one was under psychiatric treatment at the time of the judgment.”12)  Yet, Pal found 
none of them guilty in his rigorously argued, completely dissenting, opinion.  Con-
trary to many reports, Pal was not trained in international law.  He schooled himself 
on the subject on the bench.
There is little doubt that the “intensity” of Pal’s dissent and its controversial nature 
have made it of “enduring” interest to many legal scholars, historians, journalists, and 
others.  Remarks ranging from, “In the course of revisiting the Tokyo Judgment, I 
[Brook] have found my most perceptive guide to be Radhabinod Pal.  Pal’s was the 
most devastating [ judgment] in rejecting the core charge at Tokyo, that Japan had 
waged an aggressive and therefore illegal war,” to “Pal’s dissent illustrates that the fun-
damental problem with the Tokyo trial was America’s attempt to make a moral and le-
gal virtue out of a political necessity” undeniably show the impact of Pal’s judgment 
on international jurisprudence on war crimes tribunals.13)
This paper focuses on the politics of Pal’s dissenting judgment.  Politics means “pub-
lic or social ethics, the political principles, convictions, opinions, or sympathies of a 
person.”14)  All these facets are connected with Pal’s religious beliefs, social upbring-
ing, education, political events, and so on.  The legal foundations of Pal’s judgment, or 
why as a consequence he acquitted on all counts the wartime Japanese leaders, or 
even the many legal controversies thereof are not addressed, neither are international 
law, or war crimes, or the Tokyo Trial itself, though it may well touch on them to com-
plete the account.  These aspects are fairly substantially and thoroughly documented, 
analyzed, and disputed by many legal scholars, historians, journalists, and academ-
ics.15)
Here the fundamental question is: Why did not Pal indict Emperor Hirohito (1901–
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89) as a responsible party to what occurred in Japan, China, and Asia from 1926 to 
1945?  In answering this single concern, it is essential to examine: What was Pal’s poli-
tics?  How did his politics affect his judgment?  What was Pal’s judicial ethics?  The 
year 1926 was the beginning of Hirohito’s Sho¯wa (illustrious peace) era and “on 2 Sep-
tember [1945] . . .  Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru [1943–45, condemned to 7 
years imprisonment] signed the formal surrender document.”16)
The basis of focusing the fundamental query of indictment of Hirohito rests on the 
fact that Hirohito was as responsible for the war, as those arraigned before the IMT-
FE, and MacArthur’s strategy to ensure Hirohito’s survival could have been chal-
lenged by Pal.17)  Dower lays bare MacArthur’s plan:
On October 1 [1945], MacArthur received through [Brigadier General, Bonner 
F.] Fellers [MacArthur’s military secretary and head of psychological warfare op-
erations] a short legal brief that made absolutely clear that SCAP had no interest 
in seriously investigating Hirohito’s actual role in the war undertaken in his 
name.  The brief took as ‘facts’ that the emperor had not exercised free will in 
signing the declaration of war; that he had ‘lack of knowledge of the true state of 
affairs’; and that he had risked his life in attempting to effect the surrender. . . .  It 
ended with the following ‘Recommendation’: a. That in the interest of peaceful 
occupation and rehabilitation of Japan, prevention of revolution and commu-
nism, all facts surrounding execution of the declaration of war and subsequent 
position of the Emperor which tend to show fraud, menace or duress be mar-
shaled.  b. that if such facts are sufﬁcient to establish an afﬁrmative defense be-
yond a reasonable doubt, positive action be taken to prevent indictment and 
prosecution of the Emperor as a war criminal.18)
MacArthur is on record as saying: “every honor due to a sovereign is to be his,” and 
he insisted that “he [Hirohito] not be tried and executed.”19)  William Manchester, a 
biographer of MacArthur, states: “Despite strenuous objections from the Russians and 
the British, the Supreme Commander had already struck his [Hirohito’s] name from 
the list of defendants.”20)  In light of the contrived evidence presented by the prosecu-
tion, could Pal have called Hirohito as a witness and how was this legally admissible?
A prior question, which also answers the former, is: Was Hirohito a mere ﬁgurehead 
or was he, in his capacity as supreme military commander, executing his duties with 
all cognition?  Historian Herbert Bix, referring to Yamada, Akira’s book Sho¯wa tenno¯ 
no senso¯ shido¯ (The Showa Emperor’s war leadership), answers, “Yamada documents 
eleven major instances where the emperor was deeply involved in supervising the ac-
tual conduct of war operations.”21)
Further, there are the Kido (Ko¯ichi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and chief conﬁ-
dential advisor to the Emperor between 1940 and 1945) diaries.  They cover “the peri-
od from January 1, 1930 to December 15, 1945, and contained 5,920 entries.”22)  He 
was sentenced to life imprisonment as a “Class A” war criminal.  Kido “voluntarily 
turned over to the prosecution his complete diary covering the entire period under in-
vestigation.  This diary was not only the source of much valuable evidence but be-
came the working bible of the prosecution and the main key to all further investiga-
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tion.”23)  The Kido diaries gave Pal the opening to call Hirohito as a witness.
An occasion for effective intervention by Pal was when To¯jo¯ took the stand in late 
December 1947.  Bix narrates: “Under questioning by Kido’s American defense attor-
ney, William Logan, Tojo created a stir by inadvertently and indirectly implicating the 
emperor.
Logan:  Do you remember even one example where Kido proposed something 
or acted against the emperor’s wish for peace?
Tojo:  So far as I know, such an instance never arose.  Not only that, no Japa-
nese subject, let alone high ofﬁcial of Japan, would ever go against the 
will of the emperor.”24)
To¯jo¯’s testimony implicated the emperor and he was forced by Hirohito’s aides to re-
tract “his error . . . which he did on January 6, 1948.”25)  As a consequence, Hirohito 
could have been called as a witness to afﬁrm or deny To¯jo¯’s testimony and explain his 
role in the process.  This was yet another breach for Pal to thoroughly examine the 
Kido diaries.
Pal neither was the only person who could ascertain the veracity of the facts nor the 
only one with the authority to do so.  However, Pal alone had the political courage, 
intellectual rigor, and simple audacity to defy MacArthur’s ﬁat.26)  This does not imply 
that all the other justices were hapless victims of a signiﬁcantly scripted “Showcase jus-
tice”27) by senior members of SCAP, with MacArthur’s knowledge.  Yet, some justices 
certainly were not disposed to be effective in any meaningful manner in the proceed-
ings.  Dower describes how “the royalists and their American supporters engaged in 
. . . dressing the emperor in new clothes.”28)  He illustrates the process of “open social 
fraternization” between the Imperial court and the upper echelons of the occupation 
staff:
Invitations were regularly extended to high occupation ofﬁcials to participate in 
the [Imperial] court’s genteel pastimes.  Geisha parties, cherry-blossom viewing 
on the palace grounds, bamboo-sprout hunts . . . became bonding places for high 
ranking members of the occupation force and [court elites] . . . though MacAr-
thur himself never deigned to participate . . . but his wife and young son Arthur 
joined in happily.  So did the president of the Tokyo war-crimes tribunal [Sir William 
Webb, the Australian president] and the American head of the prosecution staff [ Joseph B. 
Keenan], who were in the process of hanging or incarcerating some of the emperor’s most 
devoted servants [italics added].29)
Pal was not party to such socializing, which could have compromised him at a later 
stage.
Why is a political retrospective of Pal’s judgment necessary?  First, there is not a 
scholarly study which examines the questions posed.  Second, the Pulitzer Prize-win-
ning studies by Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (2000), and Dower, Em-
bracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (1999), throw fresh light on Pal’s dis-
sent.  Third, Dower, particularly, observes that “the link between the Indian justice’s 
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nationalism and legal ‘positivism’ in this regard [that is, Pal’s judgment] has, to my 
knowledge, never been duly closely explored.”30)  These reasons validate a retrospec-
tive, political inquiry.
To a generation of Japanese, now quickly passing on, there are probably only two 
Indian names which resonate with deep meaning in their lives and psyche.  They are 
Gandhi-san and Pal-san.31)  The former refers to Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi 
(1869–1948), the architect of India’s nonviolent, political struggle for freedom and vi-
sionary moral philosopher-activist.  Gandhi never visited Japan, but with the fall of 
Singapore on February 15, 1942, and the Bay of Bengal being left without any signiﬁ-
cant defences, the victorious Japanese forces came close to “the gates of India.”32)
Then, Gandhi called upon every Indian to defend it with steadfast nonviolence, while 
advising the “Nazis, Fascists, or Japanese [that] instead of leaving India alone, [if they] 
choose to subjugate her, they will ﬁnd they will have to hold more than they can in 
their iron hoof.”33)
The latter is Radhabinod Pal,34) the Indian judge on the IMTFE.  Pal acquitted all 
the defendants.  During the occupation, his International Military Tribunal For The Far 
East: Dissenting Judgment was proscribed in Japan, on the orders of MacArthur.35)
Why did not Pal indict Hirohito of war crimes?  My rationale is explained in six 
main points.  First, there is the tu quoque argument, or “You, also,” or “You’re another.” 
This is the element of mutual wrongdoing.  A cursory perusal of Japanese media, print 
and visual, of this harrowing era will give a glimpse of the angst which Japanese expe-
rienced during World War II.
On March 10, 1945, a date which will also unequivocally “live in infamy,”36) Tokyo 
saw “300 B-29s drop 2,000 tons of incendiaries on one section of [the city]—a space 
seven-tenths the size of Manhattan—and in 2½ hours 100,000 people [were] ‘scorched 
and boiled and baked to death.’”37)  United States Air Force General Curtis (“Iron 
Ass”) E. LeMay was charged by MacArthur to carry out the bombing.  The Great To-
kyo Air Raid, Fellers observed, was “one of the most ruthless and barbaric killings of 
noncombatants in all history.”38)  Commenting on it, LeMay said: “I suppose that if I 
had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal.”  LeMay, targeted numer-
ous Japanese cities for annihilation by bombing, continued “fortunately, we were on 
the winning side.”39)
Further, consider the public testimony in 2004 by former Secretary of Defense Rob-
ert S. McNamara, in the award-winning documentary ﬁlm The Fog of War (2003) by 
Errol Morris, on the ﬁrebombing of Tokyo.  McNamara, then an Air Force colonel, 
was chief statistician to LeMay.  Essayist Roger Angell comments,
McNamara’s testimony cuts deepest when he goes back to the Second World 
War ﬁrebombing of Tokyo by the American Twentieth Air Force, whose high-al-
titude B-29 bombers, redeployed at ﬁve thousand feet, rained down incendiaries 
that killed at least eighty-ﬁve thousand civilians in a single night.  This campaign 
was continued almost in secrecy against lesser targets . . .  Sixty-seven Japanese 
cities were ﬁrebombed by the B-29s in the spring of 1945 and three hundred and 
ﬁfty thousand civilians burnt to death—and the war in effect won—well before Hi-
roshima [emphasis mine].40)
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McNamara testiﬁes: “I was part of a mechanism that in effect recommended it.”41)  He 
supports LeMay’s “perception that both of them would be prosecuted as war criminals 
if the war were to be lost, and blurted ‘What makes it immoral if you lose but moral if 
you win?’”42)
This single incident gives some insight into Pal’s thinking about the war, not to for-
get the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on August 6 and 9, 1945, respectively, in 
which collectively 103,000 innocent civilians were killed.  Pal undoubtedly grieved 
over the tragic loss of especially civilian lives in Japan and as to who were the actual 
war criminals in World War II, even prior to being appointed as a judge on the inter-
national tribunal.  Pal, as Dower correctly stresses, “felt so strongly about the criminal-
ity of the use of the atomic bombs that when he published his dissenting opinion pri-
vately in India in 1953, he included as an appendix reproductions of twenty-ﬁve 
photographs of victims of and physical destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki that 
had appeared for the ﬁrst time in Japan in the August 6, 1952 issue of the magazine 
Asahi Gurafu (Asahi Picture News).”43)
Pal, probably, was just as morally outraged at the gruesome Allied ﬁre bombing of 
German cities, particularly Hamburg in 1943 and Dresden in 1945, and the massive 
loss of civilian lives.  Writer Ian Buruma describes one such ghastly scene in his article 
“The Destruction of Germany”:
If they [RAF Lancaster bomber crews] were lucky enough to make it through the 
ﬂak, however, the bomber crew would have seen something of the inferno they 
helped set off.  Billows of smoke and ﬂame would reach heights of six thousand 
meters.  Essen, an industrial city in the Ruhr, was described by one bomber pilot 
as a huge cooking pot on the boil, glowing, even at a distance of more than two 
hundred kilometers, like a red sunset.  Another pilot recalls: ‘This is what Hell 
must be like as we Christians imagine it.  In that night I became a paciﬁst.’44)
The actual, sickening phrase used by the British Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Harris, 
also known as “Butcher” Harris, was “Hamburgerization” to ﬂatten German cities by 
“the British by night, the Americans by day and the Soviets ﬁring off their large guns 
called Stalin Organs.”45)  Sardonic as it was even then, more so in retrospect, to the 
Japanese and particularly to Pal, each of these nations—Britain, the Soviet Union, and 
the United States—were sitting in judgment over the Japanese, as they did over the 
Germans.  This was bare hypocrisy to Pal.  His substantially reasoned and passionate, 
legal objections to such “justice” were writ all over his dissenting judgment.  Hence, 
To¯jo¯’s sarcastic phrase “victor’s justice.”46)
It was with this righteous sense of fury that Pal pronounced, in his Dissenting Judg-
ment, that the prosecutors were themselves guilty.  For Pal, the decision of the Ameri-
can government to drop atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a prime exam-
ple of a crime against humanity.47)  Pal viewed the American bombing of Japanese 
civilians as a continuation of imperialism in the guise of “progress.”48)  As a result, he 
wrote:
The feeling that ‘we are a unity of humanity, linked to all our fellow human be-
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ings, irrespective of race, creed or color, by bonds which have been fused un-
breakably in the diabolical heat of those explosions’ might have been the result 
of these [atomic] blasts.  But certainly these feelings were non-existent AT THE 
TIME WHEN [sic ] the bombs were dropped.  I . . . do not perceive any such 
feelings of broad humanity in the justifying words of those who were responsible 
for their use.49)
In his view the Allied bombings of civilians and cities, like the trial, were cut from the 
same American cloth.  Consequently, in Pal’s view neither were the indicted Japanese 
war criminals and nor was the Emperor guilty.
Pal’s logic about the bombings is circuitous, digressive and unhelpful, especially 
when it comes from a justice as experienced in both the theory and practice of law. 
Pal was a “Professor of Law in the Calcutta University Law College between 1923 and 
1936 [for 13 years] and a Judge of the Calcutta High Court from 1941 to 1943.”50)  In 
lucid and thought-provoking contrast is the argument that Mark Osiel, a professor of 
law, outlines in Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law.  Osiel writes: “the wrongs 
done by X to Y neither excuse nor justify those done by Y to X.  The bombing of Na-
gasaki does not excuse or justify [emphasis added] the Rape of Nanking, as all sensible 
people readily acknowledge.”51)  What was expected from Pal was “a compelling nar-
rative that restrained the powerful temptations towards an interminable cycle of re-
crimination and reprisal over the past.”52)
Pal’s counter-narrative could have explicitly condemned the suffering of common 
Japanese soldiers and “the cruel treatment of Western POWs, including civilians in 
Southeast Asia”53) at the hands Japanese militarists, headed by Hirohito.  For instance,
Many Japanese soldiers were left to starve, abandoned by their leaders once the 
Americans had moved on.  One of the great novels of the Paciﬁc War, Fires on the 
Plain [1957], by Ooka Shohei, himself a veteran of that campaign, describes how 
the soldiers, crazed with hunger, ate their comrades’ corpses.  They called them 
‘monkeys.’  Some of these ‘monkeys’ were shot by their own hungry ofﬁcers.54)
Another example is, “In the course of the war 116,000 of 122,000 seamen serving 
Japan’s pre-war merchant ﬂeet were killed or wounded, mostly by American subma-
rines,” or that on “9 March 1945 [an] American bomber attack on Tokyo killed around 
100,000 people, and rendered a million homeless.”55)  Who took responsibility for 
such horrendous acts in the ﬁrst instance?  Condemning Churchill, Roosevelt, or 
Truman is certainly forthright, but were not the Japanese leaders equally, morally re-
sponsible for the bloodbath?  Where was Pal’s outrage at these horriﬁc massacres?  As 
a result, many if not most, Japanese today plainly refuse to acknowledge their respon-
sibility for Japan’s war crimes.
Pal placed the onus wholly on the Allies.  Do facts bear this out?  As I have shown 
above, they do not.  In this context, the pertinent challenge by Marek Edelman, the 
last surviving commander of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943, is instructive.  Edel-
man calls us to think of “the risks we run by indulging to excess the cult of commemo-
ration—and of displacing murderers with victims as the focus of attention.”56)  As to 
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these perils, political historian Tony Judt remarks, “A nation has ﬁrst to have remem-
bered something before it can begin to forget it. . . .  Only after Germans had appreci-
ated and digested the enormity of their Nazi past—a sixty-year cycle of denial, educa-
tion, debate, and consensus—could they begin to live with it, that is, put it behind 
them.”57)  In this sense, Pal’s renowned judgment does a distinct disservice to Japan 
and has made ordinary Japanese amnesiac about its own war crimes.  The ugly side of 
Japan’s role in the war and accepting its responsibility is not found in Japanese text-
books or taught to Japanese students.  Responsibility for this disquieting attitude lies to 
some extent with Pal who has now become a national embodiment of the “spirit of de-
nial” and a darling of right-wing politicians who persist in denying war crimes by Ja-
pan, especially those committed in China where the Japanese army massacred be-
tween 50,000 and 300,000 civilians in the Chinese city of Nanking in 1937 and 1938 
and causing antagonism among many Asian nations.  Two recent examples typify this 
“spirit of denial” inspired in part by Pal.  One, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo¯ 
Abe visited Prasanto Pal, the son of Radhabinod, in Kolkata on August 24, 2007 and 
told him, “The people of Japan love Radhabinod Pal and still hold him in the highest 
esteem.”58)  Two, there were mass protests against Japanese war crimes in Chinese cit-
ies “with 10,000 people marching in Shenzhen in the south” in mid-April 2005.59)
Second, it is well known that Pal was an Indian, but is equally important to know 
that he was a Bengali.  He was born to a poor family in Shalimpur in the district of 
Nadia, now in Bangladesh.  There are two aspects here, ﬁrst, about Pal’s social status 
and its implications, and second, about Pals’ educational background.  Both factors 
need clarity and correlation with his decision not to indict Hirohito.  Political psychol-
ogist Ashis Nandy writes, “The Pals were Kumbhakaras, traditionally low-caste pot-
ters.”60)  In India’s complex, caste structure Pal had to doggedly jump through many 
obstacles, social and ﬁnancial, to achieve what he did.  What needs to be explained is, 
how was Pal’s caste related to his religious belief and what relation did it have with his 
political outlook?  As to the former, Leonard Gordon, a historian, elucidates,
The basic doctrine of Shaktism is that there is a power called ‘shakti’ underlying 
and energizing all reality.  A female deity, who is usually a consort of Shiva—
Durga, Kali, Chandhi, or Shakti—may be understood to embody and express 
this power and may thus be worshipped as the single and highest deity.  This 
form of religion is widespread among the high castes of Bengal and among lower 
castes such as kumars [sic ] [The correct Hindi word is kumha¯r which means pot-
ter]. . . .  The concept of Shakti underlies a concept of physical strength.61)
In our context, Pal’s refusal to call Hirohito as a witness was that Pal bought into the 
Shinto belief that Hirohito was kami (God or deity),62) together with the American pro-
paganda that “His (Hirohito’s) indictment will unquestionably cause a tremendous 
convulsion among the Japanese people, the repercussions of which cannot be overesti-
mated.  He is a symbol which unites all Japanese.  Destroy him and the nation will 
disintegrate.”63)  Regarding the latter, Pal’s shakti beliefs morphed into Hirohito’s 
mythical, mighty, divine status coupled with the puissant attribute of kokutai (national 
essence).64)  All these aspects primed Pal to be a crypto-monarchist.
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Most journalists and academics who have written about Pal easily assumed that his 
burning ambition and sheer determination gave him the impetus to seek education as 
means of social mobility.  It is not known that Nadia, where Pal was born, was not just 
another revenue district.  Historian Kalikinkar Datta comments,
In the midst of general confusion . . . a faint but perceptible stream of culture still 
ﬂowed in certain parts of Bengal, especially in Nadia patronized by its ruler Ma-
haraja Krishna Chandra.  Nadia described as ‘the Oxford of the province,’ was a 
seat of Sanskrit learning, a centre of intellectual development.65)
Nadia’s educational status played a role in Pal’s upbringing as a lawyer and as some-
one who saw education as a tool for social mobility.  Moreover, the fact that the “local 
rajah’s family took the ﬁnancial responsibility for his [high school] studies . . . [and 
that] the family grew fond of Pal and even began to feed him as part of the daily ritual 
of feeding the poor,”66) must have created a deep sense of admiration and gratitude in 
the young Pal for royalty.  As such, Pal’s earlier religious belief of divine power as 
manifested in a monarch and admiration of royalty, coupled with his latter training as 
an advocate and judge shaped an individual reticent to scrutinize religion, law, and 
monarchy.  It would not be an exaggeration to say that all these facets, with their im-
plications, would reveal themselves later in Pal’s life as a judge.  His dissenting judg-
ment, refusal to indict, call Hirohito as a witness in open court or in camera has early 
roots in his upbringing and educational ethos.
Why is it important to stress that Pal was a Bengali?  He was born in 1886 in an In-
dia which was still very much under the British heel and a colony.  When Pal was 19 
years old and a college student, a political event took place in Bengal which must have 
moved him to deeply interrogate the motives of the British and awakened his political 
understanding about the harsh realities of colonialism.  The event was the Partition of 
Bengal in 1905 by Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy of India (1899–1905).  The event 
reverberated through India and started a ﬁrestorm of political protests.  Bengal was 
partitioned because the British saw “a great political advantage in severing the eastern 
districts, which [were] deemed to be ‘a hotbed of the purely Bengali movement, un-
friendly if not seditious in character.’  It was thought that partition would also weaken 
the tyrannical character of the press and the leaders of Calcutta.”67)  The ostensible 
reason given to Indians by Lord Curzon was that partition was affected to give Benga-
lis a much better administration and to collect revenue.  However, historical studies of 
the era by scholars show that the truth lay elsewhere.  The plain fact was a united Ben-
gal was deeply potent; a factious Bengal was politically toothless.  The main purpose 
for partition was to split up and thereby weaken a solid body of opponents to British 
rule.  Opposition to the partition of Bengal was formidable and organized on a vast 
scale, which sent the British reeling and ultimately trying to undo the folly, but the 
damage was done and lasting.
Here is what happened on the very day.  “The day of partition [October 16, 1905] 
was celebrated throughout Bengal as a day of mourning.  The poet Rabindranath 
Tagore left his seclusion to agitate, for the ﬁrst and last time, actively and write songs 
for the occasion.  As, poet, Ezra Pound said later, ‘Tagore has sung Bengal into a na-
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tion.’”68)
The impact of partition was felt so deep within every Bengali’s psyche that it was 
considered as a “national insult”69) and it would not be an overstatement to say there 
was not a single Bengali in the presidency who was not touched by this act at a very 
personal level.
Though this single event may not have turned Radhabinod, the student, into a 
seething nationalist, yet the seed of anti-imperialism was sown deep in this young Ben-
gali.  Other events in time, such as, the “cold-blooded massacre” of hundreds of inno-
cent Indians in 1919 at Jallianwala Bagh at Amritsar, Gandhi’s movement of nonvio-
lent non-cooperation in 1920, and the momentous ‘Quit India’ campaign led by 
Gandhi in 1942 would all further deepen Pal’s anti-imperialism and have an impact 
on his political views.  These facets of nationalism and anti-imperialism must be read 
into Pal’s judgment.  They would come to full bloom at the Tokyo Trial—forty-one 
years later.70)  What is the evidence?  Pal arrived in Tokyo approximately two months 
after the other members of the Tribunal and was accredited by MacArthur on May 16, 
1946—having been admitted as the last judge on the Tribunal on October 7, 1945.71)
By this time, preliminary proceedings had commenced and Pal refused to be bound 
by the unanimous decision of the original nine judges (all belonging to Allied coun-
tries) to abandon separate or dissenting opinions and publish one majority opinion. 
The decision was arrived in the absence of both Pal and Philippine Justice Delﬁn Jara-
nilla—the only other Asian—and is arguably justiﬁable.  Nonetheless “the original 
document in the U.S. National Archives bears the signatures of all the judges except 
Pal.  Nor was this an oversight.  Pal arrived in Tokyo in May and Jaranilla in June.  Yet 
the document bears Jaranilla’s name and the initialed date ‘June 1946.’”72)  Is not Pal’s 
“intention to write a dissenting opinion” perplexing?73)  Röling reveals, “I think that 
when he [Pal] joined the court, he knew from the very start that he would not ﬁnd 
anyone guilty of anything.”74)  What Pal immediately did on arrival was rightly as-
tounding and paved the way for his dissenting judgment.  Does not the decision to 
write a dissenting opinion even prior to carefully examining the evidence reveal 
shocking prejudgment?  This was Pal’s anti-imperialist and nationalist stance trumping 
his judicial obligation.  It exposes him as a judge with a predetermined political agen-
da and no qualms in pronouncing it from the bench.
Third, another event occurred in 1905 that had a great impact on the minds of most 
Indians of that era.  This was Japan’s unexpected naval victory over Czarist Russia at 
the Tsushima Straits.  This triumph was widely celebrated in colonial Bengal and Ben-
galis called it the ﬁrst Asian victory over an European imperial power.  Sumit Sarkar, 
a historian, writes that the Japanese victory “was ecstatically hailed by the Bengal press 
even children were given nicknames like Togo [Heihachiro¯, a Fleet Admiral in the Im-
perial Japanese Navy] or Nogi [Count Maresuke, a prominent ﬁgure in the Russo-Jap-
anese War] after Japanese military leaders.”75)  Here are the early origins of Pal’s Pan-
Asian ideology.  A key tenet of Pan-Asianism was that Asians in one part of the world 
were responsible for the plight of other Asians.  Japan’s victory over Russia was hailed 
by Indians, particularly Bengalis, as the signal that Europe’s imperial domination of 
Asia was reaching its nadir.
Together with this early admiration of the Japanese, there were warm cultural and 
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personal ties forged between the cultural nationalist Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), 
India’s ﬁrst Nobel laureate in 1913 and who had a vast following in his native Bengal 
and India as a whole, and the Japanese art historian Okakura, Kakuzo¯ (1862–1913) 
who visited Calcutta in 1902 and became a dear friend of the entire Tagore family. 
This was a formidable cultural alliance between India and Japan which resonated in 
the heart of every Bengali.  These ties pulled Tagore to repeatedly visit Japan in the 
early part of the twentieth century and make earnest pleas for Pan-Asianism and re-
quest for a stop to the militarism which was on the rise in Japan.  These entreaties, 
sadly, fell on deaf ears and were a source of bitter disappointment to Tagore.
The early 1940s saw the formation of the Indian National Army which the Japanese 
recruited from Indian troops after the fall of Singapore on February 15, 1942 and sent 
against the British on the Indo-Burma border in 1943.  As a nationalist, there is not 
much doubt where Pal’s sympathies lay; in fact, he revealed to Röling that he was an 
INA admirer.76)
Thus, Pal was in sympathy with Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), a radical na-
tionalist who broke with Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress on the nature of opposi-
tion to British rule.  Bose ﬁrst turned to Nazi Germany in 1941 for help to free India. 
When Hitler was not forthcoming, Bose sought Japan’s help in 1943 for an armed in-
dependence struggle against Britain.  He hoped that the Japanese-organized INA 
would become the revolutionary force that would drive the British out of India.  Ac-
cordingly, Pal a nationalist easily accepted Japan’s slogan of “Asia for Asians” and re-
garded the war as a means “to liberate Asia from the Europeans.”  ‘Japan’ evoked a 
powerful, liberating response for Pal as it did for many Indian nationalists, particularly 
Bengalis, and adherents of the philosophy of Pan-Asianism.  Few, if any, Asians asked, 
if Japan was so keen to liberate Asia from foreign domination, then why did it behave 
so heinously in the Asian countries it conquered?  How could Japan’s vicious behavior 
toward civilians be explained, not to mention its brutal treatment of POWs?  An ex-
ample of Japan’s much ﬂaunted Pan-Asian policy is that:
On December 8 [1941] the ﬁrst Japanese bombs fell on Singapore.  On the elev-
enth their planes attacked Penang . . .  No one in Malaya had seen a war in gen-
erations.  Europeans, Malays, Chinese, and Indians turned out to watch, as if 
they were attending an air show on display.  Curiosity turned to horror as the 
Japanese began straﬁng the crowds and spectators died by the hundreds. . . .  [Af-
ter the surrender] the Japanese would murder thousands, especially Singapore’s 
overseas Chinese.77)
Buruma comments, “Japanese propaganda was soaked in racist language, promoting 
the Japanese as the Asian master race”78) and “‘the Japanese practiced extraordinary 
reﬁnements of inhumanity in the treatment of those thrown upon their mercy,’ be-
cause ‘their culture encouraged, even demanded’ it.”79)  Does not this substantiate the 
disingenuousness of Pan-Asianism?  Was Pal oblivious of such reports in the British 
press in India or was he deluded by the rapid, successful advance of Japanese forces in 
Asia?  Gandhi, it should be underscored, “condemned the Japanese slogan of ‘Asia for 
Asiatics’ and even favored the boycott of Japanese goods as a mark of sympathy with 
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China.”80)  By this time another prominent Indian nationalist Rash Behari Bose (1886–
1945) had already set up a base in Japan to aid India’s independence movement and 
was helped in his efforts by To¯yama, Mitsuru, leader of the Amur River (Black Dragon 
Society) and a friend of foreign revolutionaries.  All this was fairly common knowl-
edge in the British press and among British diplomats who were making keen efforts 
to have Rash Behari Bose expelled.  Why would not Pal have identiﬁed with these ef-
forts to free his motherland by the Japanese?
Little wonder that “whenever Pal appeared in court, he unfailingly bowed to the 
defendants, whom he regarded as men who had initiated the liberation of Asia.”81)  In 
fact, United Press Correspondent Arnold Brackman, who covered the trial, writes, “In 
his memoirs [General] Sato¯ [Kenryo¯ (1895–1975), Commander of the 37th Division, 
Thailand; sentenced to life imprisonment] . . . revealed that Pal had paid him a visit at 
Sugamo [the Prison where IMTFE convicts were incarcerated and the execution site 
of those sentenced to death] after the trial ended and told him, ‘You were the leaders 
of Japan.  Through that leadership Asia was liberated.  With that in mind, I express 
my [respect to the accused].’”82)  Another account states, “The war time prime minis-
ter, Hideki Tojo, hanged as a war criminal after the Tokyo trial, even left a haiku, a 
brief poem, written in Pal’s honour before going to the gallows.83)  Pal was therefore 
not only a nationalist and a crypto-monarchist, but also a Pan-Asianist who had pre-
judged the Japanese war criminals as not guilty and it is through this prism that he 
viewed the IMTFE proceedings.
Fourth, it is a common legal norm that the appointed judge is present when the 
court is in session, except in extenuating circumstances.  Should these be of a pro-
longed nature it is legal decorum to recuse himself from future proceedings.  The 
“Charter of the IMTFE, unlike that of the Nuremberg Tribunal [1945–49] made no 
provision for alternate judges; when any member was absent, there was simply less 
than the full complement.  This produced inconsistency in the rules of evidence; what 
was admitted depending largely on who was sitting that day.”84)  This moved Webb to 
openly comment, “I would be deceiving you if I said that decisions did not turn on 
how the court was constituted from time to time.”85)  Defense lawyer Owen Cunning-
ham estimated “an aggregate of 466 judge-days was lost to the court.”86)  Which judg-
es’ conduct was most egregious?  It was none other than “Pal (India)” who was absent 
for “109 days.”87)  Lord Patrick (Britain) remarked that Pal’s absence was “the gravest 
blot that had yet stained the honour of the court.”88)  Where was Pal?  He was in India 
“at the side of his ailing wife in Calcutta [now Kolkata] . . . had missed half of the indi-
vidual defenses.”89)  Certainly, a husband had to be with his wife at such a vital mo-
ment.  However, was not it equally incumbent on Pal to formally absent himself from 
his professional duties?  Did not he know his absence would mar the historic trial? 
There is no easy answer except to say that the learned justice either lacked judicial de-
corum, despite being a professor of law and a judge for many years, or that Pal had his 
eye on history, or both.  In any case, it shows Pal in a rather poor light and as an as-
tute Realpolitician.
Fifth, at Hakone, not far from Tokyo, overlooking Lake Ashino, is the Pal–Shimonaka 
[Yasaburo¯ (1878–1961)] memorial.  The memorial, Nandy writes, “serves as a temple 
and memorial to Pal and the famous Japanese publisher Yasaburo Shimonaka . . . is 
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witness to the links that Japanese paciﬁsm established with Pal’s judgment.”90)  I visited 
the desolate place in the spring of 2003.  On the way back to Tokyo, I wondered why 
the “founder of [the] publishing house Heibonsha”91) joined hands with an Indian 
judge and set up a joint memorial as a “witness to the links [of] Japanese paciﬁsm”?92)
Were Pal and Shimonaka paciﬁsts?  What role did Shimonaka play when Japan invad-
ed Manchuria (“Mukden Incident”) in 1931, where 500 Chinese were killed?  If Shi-
monaka was indeed a paciﬁst, would not he be active in the cause?  The records cer-
tainly did not show Pal was a paciﬁst or that he had participated in any of the 
movements of nonviolent non-co-operation either as a lawyer or as a judge, despite 
Gandhi’s fervent pleas.  These factors disturbed me.  In the literature, Nandy is the 
only one who comments about the memorial93) and he does not probe these critical 
aspects.  Why did Nandy accept the memorial at face value?  Was Nandy, as Brook’s 
candidly states, enhancing “the positive posthumous reputation in India . . . of his fel-
low Bengali?”94)
Searching for answers, I found an entry in the Encyclopedia of Japan under the title 
“Shimonaka Yasaburo.”  It read, “In the 1930s Shimonaka gradually adopted a more 
nationalistic stance, founding several rightist organizations, and after World War II he 
was purged by the Occupation authorities.”95)  Nationalism could and does forge 
paciﬁsts, but rightists rarely do.
I then checked The Transcripts of the Court Proceedings the IMTFE and read to my utter 
dismay that Shimonaka was a “witness on behalf of the defense for General Matsui, 
Iwane” [Commander-in-Chief of Japanese forces in Central China, 1937–38.  Sen-
tenced to death].96)  Shimonaka testiﬁed, “General Matsui and he [Shimonaka] estab-
lished the Greater Asia Association [Dai Ajia Kyo¯-Kai ] in 1933 . . . for the reconcilia-
tion between China and Japan . . . [and] had the object of carrying out Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen’s Greater Asia Principle as its guiding spirit . . .  Blood is thicker than water; 
China and Japan are brother countries.”97)  A rightist organization founded by Shi-
monaka was the Greater Asia Association, under the guise of expanding fraternal ties 
with China.  Shimonaka concluded his defense testimony saying, “General Matsui 
loved China and the Chinese.”98)  If friendship with China was indeed so dear, then 
how could the Nanking Massacre take place?  Does this stand to reason?  Solis Horwitz, 
Assistant Prosecutor for the United States, comments, “Matsui, Iwane . . . played an 
active role as either founder, ofﬁcer or advisor of a number of ‘patriotic’ societies ad-
vocating a program of aggressive wars.”99)  Shimonaka’s sworn testimony speaks vol-
umes for his alleged ties to paciﬁsm, let alone his friendship with Matsui.  Dower re-
marks, “The former general Matsui Iwane was given the death penalty solely on 
‘negative responsibility’ grounds for having been derelict in preventing atrocities by 
troops under his command during the Nanking massacre.”100)
Is it not quite a stretch of imagination to presume Pal was not aware of Shimonaka’s 
testimony and his identity, especially since Matsui was a prominent indicted war crim-
inal?  Pal joining with Shimonaka and establishing a memorial raises more disconcert-
ing issues about Pal’s motives.  Further, Pal repeatedly visited Japan after the trial as 
early as 1952, was decorated by the Japanese Emperor in 1966, and toured Japan giv-
ing lectures with Shimonaka.  How is it possible to understand and explain Pal’s deal-
ings?  Can a judge associate with a witness, no matter how noble the endeavor?  Is 
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such behavior honorable?  In this context, Röling’s (R) conduct is illuminating:
C.  After the trial was over, did you ever go back to Japan?
R.  No, I didn’t.  Once some years after the trial, I received an invitation to go 
there, but I refused.  I felt it improper to return to the country over whose 
leaders I had been sitting in judgement [sic ].101)
The Hakone memorial carries the inscription that it promotes the “teachings of the 
great sage of the twentieth century Mahatma Gandhi.”102)  How can a rightist as Shi-
monaka and Pal who was not a paciﬁst or had anything to do with nonviolence “pro-
mote” Gandhi’s teachings?  Had not Pal read or had he forgotten Gandhi’s cardinal 
dictum of “means and ends”?  Gandhi was of the ﬁrm opinion that immoral means 
meant immoral ends.
Sixth, as explained earlier, the chief American Prosecutor Joseph Keenan was or-
dered not to indict the Emperor.  Feller’s brief to MacArthur, quoted earlier, explains 
the reasons.  Could Pal be in the dark about all that was afoot to stop such an indict-
ment and manipulate the evidence and witnesses?  What was Justice Pal’s ideology? 
What impeded Pal from subpoening Hirohito as a witness?  Yet, he fearlessly took the 
other step of dissenting from the majority judgment and refusing “the ‘politicization’ of 
the Tokyo Trial—its infusion with crusading ideology of its American sponsors, who 
were striving to create an international legal community in their own image.”103)
These critical subjects have not been thoroughly examined by any scholar.  In fairness 
to Pal the record shows that he noted “the hypocrisy of the Allied decision not to try 
the Emperor.”104)  Pal wrote, “The Emperor was implicated at every stage of the so-
called conspiracy, but his trial and punishment would have been politically inconve-
nient for the Occupation authorities.”105)  If Pal was really convinced of the Emperor’s 
implication, then did not honesty demand that Pal put his mouth where his convic-
tions lay?
Pal’s ideology was a combination of his illusive legal reasoning, ardent nationalism, 
beguiling Pan-Asianism, nascent crypto-monarchism, shocking lack of judicial ethics, 
and unshakable admiration of Japan.  All these made him reluctant to interrogate 
Hirohito in open court.  Also, Pal bought into the propaganda that Japan at that time 
could not hold without a central ﬁgure and the Americans would colonize the country, 
which they did successfully nonetheless.  Being a colonial subject for a large part of his 
life, Pal knew well the travails of colonialism.  Undoubtedly, Pal was a creature of the 
law and revered it.  In Japan, given the time and the nascent democratic institutions, 
the emperor was the law.  There was probably nothing else which would hold the 
country from anarchy, if monarchy was abolished.  Ergo, Pal was legally difﬁdent to 
confront Hirohito with the evidence and as such is his amazing, inconsistent and polit-
ical judgment.  How paradoxical it is that Pal loudly decried the political trial by the 
IMTFE, even as he blatantly politicized it himself.
In conclusion, it is edifying to reﬂect on what Tom Bingham, a Senior Law Lord 
from Britain, writes on judges and their behavior on and off the bench.  Bingham em-
phasizes that, “The judge’s duty [is] to administer justice ‘without fear or favour, affec-
tion or ill will’ [and it] plainly covers a wide range of ethical duties.  If one were to at-
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tempt a modern paraphrase, it might perhaps be that a judge must free himself of 
prejudice and partiality and so conduct himself, in court and out of it, as to give no 
ground for doubting his ability and willingness to decide cases coming before him 
solely on their legal and factual merits as they appear to him in the exercise of an ob-
jective, independent, and impartial judgment.”106)  Bingham persists, “It is now regard-
ed . . . as a cardinal feature of judicial impartiality that the judge should be a political 
eunuch.  If he was ever a member of any political party or organization, he must sever 
all ties on appointment.  Thereafter he must do nothing which could give rise to any 
suggestion of political partisanship.”107)  Was Justice Pal a political eunuch or a deter-
mined partisan?  This political retrospective conﬁrms that the second alternative can-
not but be answered in the afﬁrmative and the foregoing is substantial evidence against 
Justice Radhabinod Pal.
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